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This Essay identifies a new boundary in patent law-illegal or
immoral invention creation activity-and explores the possible chal-
lenges and opportunities it may facilitate. The boundary currently is
neither robust nor extensive, and whether and under what cir-
cumstances it should exist at all is open to debate.
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INTRODUCTION
Set in eighteenth-century France, author Patrick Suskind's novel
Perfume tells the story of Jean-Baptiste Grenouille, a man who,
from birth, had no personal body odor, which had the effect of
alienating him from others.' Lacking a personal scent but having an
unusually refined sense of smell, Grenouille, an inventor, became
obsessed with developing the perfect perfume that would cause
people to adore him. He succeeded in his quest. Unfortunately, his
method of creating this compound was to murder young women and
extract fragrance compounds from their bodies.
Fast-forward to the twenty-first century and imagine that
Grenouille seeks a patent on his useful, novel, and nonobvious
composition of matter. Should the fact that he murdered people in
order to create the invention have any impact on his ability to ob-
tain a patent or on the enforceability of any patent he does obtain?
Although this is a hypothetical question, an increasing number
of countries are considering, in patentability determinations, past
"bad" activities in creating inventive subject matter. Such inquiries
traditionally have been irrelevant to an invention's ultimate pat-
entability or to patent enforceability, but times are changing. This
Essay, written in conjunction with a conference on boundaries in
intellectual property law, identifies what is shaping up to be a new
boundary in patent law: invention creation activity.2
As in real property determinations, patent law contains numerous
boundaries, or limits, delineating the criteria for obtaining patent
protection and for losing it. Unfortunately, patent law boundaries
1. PATRICK SUSKIND, PERFUME: THE STORY OF A MURDERER (John E. Woods trans.,
1986). Special thanks to Dr. Doris Walter for sharing this hypothetical.
2. Patent rights are territorial and differ in varying respects from country to country. In
this Essay, I take a global view of patent law for the sake of simplicity, as well as to denote
the impact that changes in the patent laws of one country can have on those of another. There
currently are no meaningful efforts underway to begin incorporating invention creation
activity inquiries into U.S. patent law; however, observable trends in other countries suggest
it may be prudent to analyze the issues and opportunities such a boundary engenders.
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tend to be difficult to ascertain3 and are subject to both expansion4
and contraction.5
Whereas patent law boundary locations may change, the bound-
aries themselves are quite stable. Subject matter, utility, novelty,
nonobviousness, and others continue to be the basis for patent
limits, and it is rare to see old boundaries eliminated or new
boundaries created.6 Yet it appears that a new boundary-invention
creation activity-is being erected in patent law today.7
3. Patent claim scope is a prime example. As explained by Professor Mark Lemley:
[B]oth the physical and legal boundaries of real property are, in the main, clear.
We can all find out what the boundaries of real property are, either by looking
at physical fences or by going down to the county recorder's office and
determining where the lines exist. We also have a good idea what the legal rules
are with respect to property-physical intrusion is generally forbidden, and
other kinds of intrusion generally aren't....
Neither "boundary" is clear in intellectual property law, however. It is
difficult-and in many cases impossible-to know whether one is "trespassing"
upon another's intellectual property right. In part this is a problem with defining
the scope of the legal right in question. While courts sometimes talk about
patent claims as defining the "metes and bounds" of the legal right, claims lack
the certainty associated with real property deeds.... Not until the Federal Circuit
rules on the meaning of any particular claim can the patent owner or its
competitors know what is owned and what isn't.
Mark A. Lemley, Reply, What's Different About Intellectual Property?, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1097,
1100-01 (2005).
4. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,309-10 (1980) (expanding the patent-
eligible subject matter boundary to include living matter); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (expanding the patent-
eligible subject matter boundary to include business methods).
5. See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (contracting the
nonobviousness patentability requirement boundary); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 965-66 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (contracting the patent-eligible subject matter boundary in relation to non-
computer-implemented mental methods).
6. The statutory nonobviousness boundary of 35 U.S.C. § 103 was added in the Patent
Act of 1952 but was judicially created more than a century earlier. See generally John F.
Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2007).
7. There is considerable consistency in patent law boundaries around the world, due in
part to treaties such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS), which set minimum standards of protection that countries must provide for patents.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 127, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299,33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. Nevertheless, countries may have
additional, specific boundaries in their systems, such as the inequitable conduct boundary in
the United States. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2008).
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Recently, applicants for patents in places such as the countries of
Europe, Japan, Peru, India, and Brazil have begun facing invention
creation activity issues in relation to inventions involving human
embryonic stem cells (raising morality concerns) and illegally
obtained genetic resources.8 New revisions to China's patent law
include invention creation activity provisions as well.9
Traditionally, inventor/owner conduct has only been relevant, if
at all, in two distinct time periods: (1) after the filing of an applica-
tion, and (2) before patent issuance. Even then, such conduct is
relevant only to patent enforceability, not validity, based on theories
derived from the equitable doctrine of unclean hands. ° For example,
in the United States, doctrines such as inequitable conduct and
prosecution laches can be asserted to bar enforcement of a patent
based on misconduct of the patentee in prosecuting the appli-
cation;11 and after a patent issues, the doctrines of patent misuse,
equitable estoppel, laches, and more may be invoked to bar en-
forceability based on patentee misconduct in enforcing the patent. 12
Pre-filing: Post-Filing: Post-Issuance:
Emerging Inequitable conduct Patent Misuse
restrictions? Prosecution laches Estoppels
I I
The idea of patent offices engaging in a similar inquiry for pre-
application filing, invention creation conduct is new, but not com-
pletely surprising.13 It is, perhaps, not a coincidence that inventions
8. See generally LeRoy Walters, Human Embryonic Stem Cell Researck An Intercultural
Perspective, 14 KENNEDY INST. ETHIcs J. 3 (2004).
9. See infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806
(1945).
11. See, e.g., Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
12. See, e.g., Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
13. Of course, it is possible that random instances of such inquiries exist around the world
that simply have not been cataloged. For example, Professor Shamnad Basheer has identified
an Indian case in which invention creation activity served as a bar to patentability under a
morality provision. He notes:
[There appears to be only one unreported instance of the use of this exception
by the Indian Patent Office. The invention in this case related to medicinal
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involving life forms comprise the current context in which invention
creation activity questions are arising and that this is an area
where utility patent protection was essentially unavailable thirty
years ago, before the landmark Diamond v. Chakrabarty" decision.
In Chakrabarty, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that living matter,
such as genetically modified bacteria, could qualify for patent
protection, opening the floodgates to the patenting of morally
controversial biotech inventions ranging from transgenic animals
and plants, to genetic DNA sequences and human embryonic stem
cell products.'5 Perhaps it was inevitable that expansions in the
scope of patent-eligible subject matter would lead, in some countries
at least, to a concomitant increase in restrictions on the patenting
of such inventions or the enforceability of patents on such inven-
tions.
Part I of this Essay describes the new boundary's appearance in
relation to illegal and immoral invention creation activity, as well
as its possible future extension to unethical activity such as that at
issue in Moore v. Regents of the University of California.6 Part II
discusses potential issues and opportunities that the new boundary
raises while also exposing its current fragility. The Essay ultimately
concludes that invention creation activity is a new boundary whose
contours bear watching and whose continued development, if there
is any, should be cautious, incremental, and well-considered.
powder prepared from skeletal remains of dead bodies dug up within a week of
burial. Digging up graves for profit-oriented purposes was seen as highly
objectionable by the patent office.
Posting of Shamnad Basheer to Spicy IP, Grave Diggers, "Immoral" Patents and the NBRA,
http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2008/07/grave-diggers-immoral-patents-and-nbra.html (July
30, 2008, 20:30). However, I have found no evidence of systematic application of such a
boundary in traditional patentability determinations.
14. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
15. Id. at 309-10; see also Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality
and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 475-76 (2003).
16. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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I. ILLEGAL, IMMORAL, AND UNETHICAL ACTIVITY IN INVENTION
CREATION
Although questions of the illegality or morality of the use of an
invention'7 have often come into play throughout history and up to
the present time, there appears to be little precedent for con-
sidering the acts of invention creation in the determination of either
patentability or patent enforceability. 8
Until now. Recent legislative actions and judicial decisions in
China, Europe, and beyond illustrate the emergence of the new
invention creation activity boundary in relation to illegal and
immoral conduct.
17. For example, the prohibition on the patenting of inventions "useful solely in the
utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon" is concerned
with how the invention will be used, not how the invention was created. 42 U.S.C. § 2181
provides in relevant part:
(a) Denial of patent; revocation of prior patents
No patent shall hereafter be granted for any invention or discovery which is
useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an
atomic weapon. Any patent granted for any such invention or discovery is
revoked, and just compensation shall be made therefor.
(b) Denial of rights; revocation of prior rights
No patent hereafter granted shall confer any rights with respect to any
invention or discovery to the extent that such invention or discovery is used in
the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in atomic weapons.
Any rights conferred by any patent heretofore granted for any invention or
discovery are revoked to the extent that such invention or discovery is so used,
and just compensation shall be made therefor.
42 U.S.C. § 2181 (2006). For a discussion of the rejection of patents for inventions such as
gambling machines and other devices used in deception or fraud, see Bagley, supra note 15,
at 489.
18. Allegations ofillegal activity in invention creation are not completely unknown to U.S.
law. For example, in Bio-Technology General Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir.
1996), a defendant accused of patent infringement argued that the plaintiff had '"misap-
propriated inventions, materials, people and information' from the University of California"
and that the plaintiff should be barred from enforcing the patent under the doctrine of
unclean hands. Id. at 1565. However, the court gave short shrift to this argument, finding the
assertions to be without evidentiary support and outside the context of the lawsuit. Id. Also,
in Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997), the
court rejected assertions that a patent should be deemed unenforceable for inequitable
conduct when the alleged bad behavior was noncompliance with National Institute of Health
guidelines and misrepresentation of information in the patent application. Id. at 1569-71. The
court deemed the misconduct immaterial to patentability, and there was no framing or
consideration of the question as improper invention creation activity. Id.
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A. Illegal: Genetic Resources and Disclosure of Origin
For several decades, interests in the United States and abroad
have been concerned with intellectual property protection in China.
Although China has often been criticized for having weak intellec-
tual property laws and lax enforcement of those laws, in recent
years the country has increased efforts to protect intellectual
property and to encourage domestic entities to pursue the develop-
ment and protection of intellectual property.19 One result of this
policy change is that the Chinese State Intellectual Property Office
(SIPO) has seen an exponential increase in patent applications.2"
Despite having a patent statute since only 1984, China's SIPO has
jumped from a position of relative obscurity to number three in the
world in the number of utility patent applications received each
year, and that number is climbing.2 On December 27, 2008, China's
top legislative body, the National People's Congress Standing
Committee, passed the Third Amendment to the Chinese Patent
Law, which went into effect October 1, 2009.22 The Third Amend-
ment includes a provision that would deny patentability to any
invention created using genetic resources obtained in violation of
Chinese law. The new Article 5 states:
No patent right shall be granted for any invention-creation that
is contrary to the laws of the State or social morality or that is
detrimental to the public interest.
19. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 13-15
(2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Full%/2OVersion%20oP/20the%
202009%20SPECIAL%20301%20REPORT.pdf; Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009).
20. State Intellectual Prop. Office of the P.R.C., Applications for Three Kinds of Patents
Received from Home and Abroad, 2000-2006 (June 11, 2007), http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo-
English/statistics/200804/t20080416_380894.html.
21. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS 17
(2009), available at http://www.wipo.intlexport/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/pdfl
wipopub_ 941.pdf. In fact, China ranks number one when utility patent, utility model, and
industrial applications are combined. Id. at 17, 48, 70. The United States, Japan, China,
Korea, and the European Patent Office received the most applications in 2007. Id. at 17.
22. Yan Wenfeng, NPC OKs New Patent Law, CHINA REP.: INTELL. PROP., Dec. 31, 2008,
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo-Englishlnews/ChinaPNews/2008/200904P0200904085799028
33623.pdf [hereinafter Chinese Patent Law].
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No patent right shall be granted for any invention-creation
which is completed on the basis of genetic resources of which the
acquisition or use breaches the stipulations of related laws and
regulations.23
Thus, for the first time under Chinese patent law, the revised draft
introduces special measures to make violation of genetic resource
acquisition laws in invention creation a basis for denying patent-
ability or invalidating a patent.
The draft implementing guidelines for the new Act define genetic
resources to include genetic material extracted from humans,
animals, and plants, such as blood, genes, organs, and skin, if the
invention relies on the "genetic functionality" of the material.24
In addition to Article 5, the revised Chinese Patent Act contains
another provision related to genetic resource acquisition, Article 26,
which states in part:
An applicant who files a patent application for an invention-
creation completed on the basis of genetic resources shall in the
patent application document indicate the direct and indirect
source of the genetic resources; the applicant unable to indicate
the original source of the genetic resource must provide an
explanation.25
Article 26 thus requires applicants to disclose the country of
origin of relevant genetic resources in addition to the direct sup-
plier. Failure to supply the required information is a basis for
23. EU-CHINA IPR2, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, THIRD REVISION OF CHINA'S PATENT LAW:
LEGAL TExTs AND DOCUMENTS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS 2006-2008, at 11 (2009), available
at http://www.ipr2.orgimages/eu-patentlaw-090805-7-fnal.pdf [hereinafter CHINAS PATENT
LAW].
24. Amy Feng, Update on Patent Development of the Life Science Field in China, Address
at the Second Beijing International Pharmaceutical and Chemical Intellectual Property
Forum, at slide 17 (Aug. 6, 2009) (powerpoint slides, on file with author). Use of genetic
functionality has yet to be defined. In a humorous bit of irony, at the same time that China's
new patent law denies patentability to inventions created using illegal activity, the patent
office in the Chinese province of Gansu recently issued rules to encourage prison inmates to
apply for patents. Intellectual Prop. Prot. in China, Gansu Issues Rules To Urge Inmates To
Apply for Patents (July 28, 2009), http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/Frontier/286288.shtml.
25. CHINA'S PATENT LAW, supra note 23, at 15.
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rejecting claims in an application, but apparently not for invalidat-
ing an already issued patent.26
26. Feng, supra note 24, at slide 17. Violating the new Chinese Patent Act only impacts
patentability/validity. But the laws of some other countries go even further. For example, a
Brazilian law regulating access to components of Brazilian genetic heritage contains a variety
of penalties for violation of genetic resource laws in creating patentable inventions. Such
penalties include: payment to the Federal Government of at least twenty percent of the gross
income or royalties from commercializing or licensing the resulting product (benefit sharing),
Medida Provis6ria No. 2.186-16, de 23 de agosto de 2001, D.O.U. de 24.08.2001, tit. VII, art.
26 (Brazil), available at http://www.planalto.gov/br/cciviL03/mpv/2186-16.htm; suspension
or cancellation of the resulting patent, id. at tit. VIII, art. 30, and much more. Disclosure of
the origin of genetic material used in creating an invention must be disclosed in the patent
application, id. at tit. IX, art. 31.
India's Biodiversity Act has even stiffer penalties, such as imprisonment, while also
allowing for retroactive permission and the imposition of benefit-sharing conditions. The law
provides in part:
6. (1) No person shall apply for any intellectual property right by whatever
name called in or outside India for any invention based on any research or
information on a biological resource obtained from India without obtaining the
previous approval of the National Biodiversity Authority before making such
application:
Provided that if a person applies for a patent, permission of the National
Biodiversity Authority may be obtained after the acceptance of the patent but
before the sealing of the patent by the patent authority concerned.
(2) The National Biodiversity Authority may, while granting the approval
under this section, impose benefit sharing fee or royalty or both or impose
conditions including the sharing of financial benefits arising out of the
commercial utilisation of such rights.
Penalties
55. (1) Whoever contravenes or attempts to contravene or abets the contra-
vention of the provisions of section 3, section 4, or section 6 shall be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine which
may extend to ten lakh rupees and where the damage caused exceeds ten lakhs
such fine may be commensurate with the damage caused, or with both,
Offences by Companies
57. (1) Where an offence or contravention under this Act has been committed by
a company, every person who at the same time the offence or contravention was
committed was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct
of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be
guilty of the offence or contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against
and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall render any such
person liable to any punishment provided in this Act, if he proves that the
offence or contravention was committed without his knowledge or that he had
exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence or
contravention.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:577
These new provisions appear to be designed to address several
concerns relating to biopiracy. "Biopiracy" has been defined as "[t]he
patenting of plants, genes, and other biological products that are
indigenous to a foreign country" without compensating the keepers
of those resources and the holders of knowledge appropriated
during ethnobiological research processes.27 Many biodiversity-rich
countries, like China, are changing their laws to deny patentability
to inventions created with illegally acquired genetic resources.2"
Such countries include members of the Andean Community, Brazil,
and India.29 These countries and others also have been pressing in
several multilateral fora for a new Disclosure of Origin (DOO)
patentability requirement that would address benefit sharing and
prior informed consent. ° Such efforts are consistent with, and
designed to give effect to, the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD).3' The CBD established that genetic resources are not the
Biological Diversity Act 2002, No. 18 of 2003 (India), available at http://www.
nbaindia.orglact/act_english.htm. The Act in Section 2 defines "biological resources" as
including plants, animals and micro-organisms or parts thereof, their genetic material and
by-products, but, unlike China, does not include human genetic material. Id.; see also Andean
Community, Commission Decision 391: Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources,
Complementary Provisions (July 17, 1996), http://www.sice.org/trade/JUNAC/decisiones/
DEC391e.asp ("The Member Countries shall not acknowledge rights, including intellectual
property rights, over genetic resources, by-products or synthesized products and associated
intangible components, that were obtained or developed through an access activity that does
not comply with the provisions of this Decision.").
27. The Word Spy, http://www.wordspy.com/words/biopiracy.asp (last visited Oct. 17,
2009). For examples and discussions of perceived instances of biopiracy, see Lorna Dwyer,
Biopiracy, Trade, and Sustainable Development, 19 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY 219, 227
(2008); Kaitlin Mara, Indigenous Groups Express Concerns on IP Protection of Their
Knowledge, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.ip-watch.orgtweblog/2008/03/03/
indigenous-groups-express-concerns-on-ip-protection-of-their-knowledge/.
28. It is argued that such provisions, relating only to inventions made with genetic
materials, are in conflict with the TRIPS Agreement which, in Article 27, bars discrimination
in patentability based on technology. See, e.g., Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure
of Origin of Genetic Resources and Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications Without
Infringing the TRIPS Agreement: The Problem and the Solution, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 371
(2000); Graham Dutfield, Thinking Aloud on Disclosure of Origin (Quaker United Nations
Office, QUNO Occasional Paper 18, 2005); Thomas Moga, Changing China's Patent Regime,
Butzel Long, http://www.butzel.com/pdf070601artAutoAlley.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2009)
(discussing possible tensions with TRIPS).
29. QUEEN MARY INTELLECTUAL PROP. INST., REPORT ON DISCLOSURE OF ORIGIN IN PATENT
APPLICATIONS 52-55 (2004), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/dochb/docs/2O05/June/
tradoc_123533.pdf [hereinafter QUEEN MARY REPORT].
30. Id. at 5.
31. Comments by the Chinese SIPO on the 2006 draft revisions to patent law provide
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common heritage of mankind, but rather are the property of
sovereigns who should make access to them available under
principles of prior informed consent (PIC) and access and benefit
sharing (ABS).32
In July 2008, a group of World Trade Organization (WTO)
member countries33 introduced a proposed amendment to the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS) that would address these issues as follows:
4. Members agree to amend the TRIPS Agreement to include a
mandatory requirement for the disclosure of the country
providing/source of genetic resources, and/or associated tradi-
tional knowledge for which a definition will be agreed, in patent
applications. Patent applications will not be processed without
completion of the disclosure requirement.
5. Members agree to define the nature and extent of a reference
to Prior Informed Consent and Access and Benefit Sharing.
some insight into the motivations for Articles 5 and 26. After discussing CBD principles, the
comments state:
Measures taken to protect China's genetic resource[s] at least include the
following two aspects: one is to establish a management mechanism for genetic
resource[s] through special legislation to prevent any person from obtaining
China's genetic resource[s] without the approval of the relevant department and
impose an administrative fine or even criminal punishment to the violator; and
the other is to add relevant provisions to the Patent Law so as to stop the act of
illegal obtaining or use of the genetic resource[s] based on which the creations
are completed.
CHINA'S PATENT LAW, supra note 23, at 55.
32. Convention on Biological Diversity art. 15, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143, 152; see
also Cynthia M. Ho, Biopiracy and Beyond. A Consideration of Socio-Cultural Conflicts with
Global Patent Policies, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 433, 473 (2006). DOO regimes and proposals
fall into three basic categories: (1) strong-mandatory disclosure accompanied by access and
benefit sharing provisions, including proof of legal acquisition; (2) medium-mandatory
disclosure only; and (3) weak--disclosure is simply "encouraged or even expected but not
required." QUEEN MARY REPORT, supra note 29, at 3. China, India, and Brazil's regimes all
appear to fit in the "strong" category.
33. The sponsors were Albania, Brazil, China, Ecuador, the European Communities,
India, Indonesia, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Pakistan,
Peru, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the ACP Group, and the African Group.
Trade Negotiations Committee, Draft Modalities for TRIPS Related Issues, TN/C/W/52 (July
19, 2008). These same countries also pushed for an amendment addressing protection of
geographical indications of origin in tandem with this proposal. World Trade Organization,
TRIPS: Geographical Indications, Background and the Current Situation, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/trips-e/gibackgrounde.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).
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6. Text based negotiations shall be undertaken ... to implement
the above. Additional elements .... such as PIC and ABS as an
integral part of the disclosure requirement and post-grant
sanctions [such as invalidity or unenforceability], may also be
raised and shall be considered in these negotiations.34
What factors are driving this effort? Sabrina Safrin posits that
the expansion of patent subject matter to include genetic material
initiated a chain reaction, leading to the desire among biodiversity-
rich developing countries for second-generation property rights over
sovereign resources used to create inventions.35 As she explains:
Why, these [developing] countries asked, should individuals and
companies from gene-poor developed countries obtain genetic
material free of charge from gene-rich developing countries
when they then patent these genes and at times sell them back
to the country where the genetic material originated? Moreover,
developing countries faced increasing pressure [from developed
countries] to extend patent protection to man-made living
organisms and their genetic material....
The key operating dynamic is that of a tit-for-tat. Namely, if
developed countries assert and demand that developing coun-
tries recognize intellectual property rights over man-made living
organisms and isolated and purified genetic sequences, then
developing countries believe that they should also assert prop-
erty interests over the raw genetic material that may contribute
to the patented goods.36
The fact that emerging economies are taking the lead by incorporat-
ing genetic resource protection measures into their domestic laws
suggests these issues will continue to be pushed in multilateral fora
as well. As explained by Rochelle Dreyfuss:
34. Id. The amendment did not pass and its future is uncertain, yet its introduction, and
the continued focus on these issues by many countries, suggests this is an issue that is not
going away any time soon.
35. Sabrina Safrin, Chain Reaction: How Property Begets Property, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1917, 1917 (2007) (arguing that the Court's decision in Chakrabarty initiated this
expansion).
36. Id. at 1928, 1931 (citations omitted).
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[E]merging economies such as India, Brazil, and China, may
well hold the key to the future.... [T]hese countries have a thick
legal and political culture and can ably defend their domestic
legislation in international circles. As emerging economies move
into a leadership position in establishing new practices ... they
are sure to challenge the preeminent role of the North in setting
world norms for intellectual property protection.37
An interesting question raised by DOO and illegal acquisition pro-
visions that deny patentability for violations of genetic resource
acquisition laws in order to allow for benefit sharing is how such
laws actually contribute to the reallocation of and sharing in the
benefits of such inventions. If the patent claims are invalid or
unenforceable, one would expect revenue from the patent to be
negatively impacted. The Brazilian provisional law and Indian
Biological Diversity Act both allow the government to share in the
financial benefits from the invention and do not mandate patent in-
validity or unenforceability." China's approach apparently does not
mandate benefit sharing; however, future implementing guidelines
for the new Act may include such a requirement.
Under the Demsetzian view that private property rights arise to
allow parties to internalize externalities,39 it is not surprising that
individuals and groups that provide access to and conservation of
genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge might also
wish to share in internalizing some of the benefits to which they
37. Rochelle Dreyfuss, The Role of India, China, Brazil and Other Emerging Economies
in Establishing Access Norms for Intellectual Property and Intellectual Property Lawmaking
2-3 (Inst. for Int'l Law and Justice, Working Paper No. 09-53, 2009), available at http:I
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1442785. Comments on the revised Chinese
patent act by SIPO are quite explicit on this point:
In recent years, developing countries have repeatedly advocated the ... formation
of international regulations for the protection of genetic resources in the World
Trade Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization and other
international organizations. However, these efforts have made little headway
due to the obstruction of developed countries.... [I]t is of necessity for China to
use the practice of relevant developing countries for reference and carry out the
protection of genetic resource through legislation in the country.
CHINA'S PATENT LAW, supra note 23, at 55.
38. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
39. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348
(1967).
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have contributed.4" Yet not all groups are financially motivated.
Some groups are primarily motivated by concerns regarding control
and overexploitation of the genetic resources in their region.4 The
creation of a statutory DOO requirement for genetic materials and
traditional knowledge, along with a statutory provision denying
patentability to inventions made with illegally-obtained genetic
resources, represents one means for allowing possibly aggrieved
parties to determine if a law was broken by the inventor and if a
claim for relief is justified.
Outside of the context of genetic resources and traditional
knowledge, there are, of course, a variety of other scenarios in which
the patentability of an invention could be compromised if the
illegality of invention creation activity were made a patentability
criteria. For example, the use of fetal tissue obtained from a partial
birth abortion performed in violation of the Partial Birth Abortion
Ban Act,42 using plants or wildlife removed from a U.S. national
park without authorization,43 the falsification of data to obtain a
federal grant,44 or even engaging in patent infringement are all
illegal activities that could result in invention creation.
Determining which illegal activities are sufficiently egregious to
warrant censure through the patent system, with the concomitant
risk to the patent incentive, would be a complicated undertaking.
Moreover, issues of proximate cause between the illegal activity and
the creation of the invention (for example, a researcher being
ticketed for speeding on the way to her laboratory), as well as
whether the violation of laws in one country should impact patent-
40. Although, as Professor Safrin notes, the profit motive can only partially explain the
actions of developing countries in this area as cost-benefit analyses appear to be missing from
the discussion. Safrin, supra note 35, at 1931.
41. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific and
Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 919, 955
(1996) ('The goal is not simply to receive money in exchange for access to knowledge and
resources, but to control whether, and how, such knowledge is commercialized, while also
leaving it available for noncommercial uses.").
42. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (upholding the constitutionality of
the Partial Birth Abortion Act).
43. See 36 C.F.R. § 2.1(a)(1) (2009).
44. See, e.g., Findings of Scientific Misconduct, 74 Fed. Reg. 4201, 4201-02 (Jan. 23, 2009)
(notice) (barring MIT researcher from receiving federal funds for falsifying data in multiple
immunology projects).
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ability in another, would also require resolution.4" Nevertheless,
although determining that an activity is illegal can be difficult, that
complexity pales in comparison with determining morally unaccept-
able activities.
B. Immoral: Destruction of Human Embryos
Much illegal activity can be considered a subset of immoral
activity as it is generally considered to be "wrong" to break the
law.46 Thus, murder and theft are not only illegal activities, they are
also immoral activities.
The patent laws of many countries contain provisions allowing
for the denial of a patent to an invention whose exploitation or
publication would violate public order or morality.47 Such provisions
facially apply only to consideration of the use of, or at most the
nature of, an invention. However, the controversy over human
embryonic stem cell patents in Europe provides an interesting
example in which legal activities involved in creating an invention
that is not otherwise objectionable still render that invention
unpatentable for moral reasons.4"
The Convention on the Grant of European Patents, better known
as the European Patent Convention or EPC, contains substantive
and procedural requirements for obtaining a European patent valid
in all thirty-four member countries and four extension states, with
45. An example might be a violation of the genetic resource acquisition laws in China, or
developing a therapy in Israel by using human embryonic stem cells for cloning purposes,
which is against Israeli law. The Prohibition of Genetic Intervention (Human Cloning and
Genetic Manipulation of Reproductive Cells) Law, 1998, S.H. 47 (Isr.). An analysis of such
issues is beyond the scope of this Essay but will, hopefully, be addressed in future work.
46. Of course, there are exceptions to that rule. As one blogger notes:
Everytime you willfully break a law you are willfully breaking law itself. Only
in a small way, but you are. This doesn't mean there is a never a reason to do so,
if the law demands you round up Jews to be killed, you can break that law
accepting that the devaluation of law is a consequence (and regretting that
consequence) whilst still recognising that the cost is worth it.
When You Break the Law You Vote for Anarchy, http://proudyoungreactionary.blogspot.
com/2008/03/when-you-break-law-you-vote-for-anarchy.html (Mar. 21,2008) (blogis no longer
active).
47. In fact, TRIPS explicitly allows WTO member countries to exclude such inventions
from patentability. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 27(2).
48. See infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
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only a single application.49 It also contains an express morality-
based patent eligibility bar. EPC Article 53 states that:
European patents shall not be granted in respect of:
(a) inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be
contrary to "ordre public" or morality; such exploitation shall not
be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by
law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting States.5 °
Article 53(a) not only provides a basis for European Patent Office
(EPO) examiners to reject a patent application, but any member of
the public can lodge an opposition to the grant of a patent on this or
one of several other patentability bases at any time within nine
months of the EPO decision to issue the patent.5' The Patent Act of
49. See European Patent Office, How To Apply for a European Patent, http://www.
european-patent-office.org/grjindex.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2009). The European patent is
treated as a national patent in each member country. See Convention on the Grant of
European Patents (European Patent Convention) arts. 1-3, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199,
available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/epc.html [hereinafter EPC];
Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the
Community Patent, at 4, COM (200) 412 final (Jan. 8, 2000), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2000:0412:FIN:EN:PDF [hereinafter
Proposal]. Applicants can still seek patent protection in individual EPC member countries
exclusively or concurrently; however, only one patent (national or European) will ultimately
be maintained. See European Patent Office, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.epo.
org/help/faq.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2009).
50. EPC, supra note 49, art. 53(a), at 80. The proviso in Article 53(a) means that illegality
of the invention (that is, of its use) in a Contracting State cannot alone provide the basis for
a denial of patentability, although perhaps illegality under a supranational treaty such as the
European Convention on Human Rights could suffice. According to the EPO Guidelines, one
of the rationales for the proviso was that "a product could still be manufactured under a
European patent for export to States in which its use is not prohibited."' Amanda Warren-
Jones, Finding a "Common Morality Codex"for Biotech - A Question of Substance, 39 INT'L
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 638, 655 (2008) (quoting EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE,
GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE Part C-IV, para. 3.1 (2001));
see DERYCK BEYLEVELD & ROGER BROWNSWORD, MICE, MORALITY AND PATENTS 72 (1993)
("[Tihe European Convention on Human Rights is not law or regulation in (meaning within)
the Contracting States, but constitutes some part of the constitutional framework by which
the Contracting States constitute an emerging unified legal order ... [thus] the fact that
something is regulated against is sometimes sufficient for the Examiners to declare it to be
immoral.").
51. See EPC, supra note 49, art. 99, at 124; id. art. 100. The United States has no
comparable post-grant proceeding allowing for public intervention in the issuance of a patent,
as reexamination is a much more limited tool. See 35 U.S.C. § 603 (2006). Moreover, as
established by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Animal Legal Defense Fund v.
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Japan contains a similar provision in section 32: "inventions liable
to contravene public order, morality or public health shall not be
patented.'2 Both of these provisions facially focus on issues asso-
ciated with the nature of the invention and its use, not on how it
was created.
In 1998, the European Union (EU) adopted a Biotechnology
Directive designed to harmonize the patent eligibility of biotech-
nology-related subject matter in the EU member states.53 In
drafting the directive, the European Parliament and Council had
two primary goals. The first was to clarify and harmonize the legal
protection of biotech inventions in the region to increase investment
in biotechnology research.54 For years, the EU had lagged behind
the United States and Japan in biotechnology, a deficit attributed,
at least in part, to insufficient and inconsistent patent rights.5
The second goal was to preserve the right of EU member states to
consider moral questions in determining patent-eligible subject
matter, as they had been able to do under EPC Article 53(a).5"
Article 6, paragraph 1 of the European Union Biotechnology
Directive essentially restates the EPC Article 53(a) position that
"[i]nventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commer-
cial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality."57
Paragraph 2 of Article 6 then takes the further step of providing an
explicit, nonexclusive list of subject matter that would be considered
Quigg, members of the public also lack standing to challenge the validity of a patent in court.
See 932 F.2d 920, 924-25 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
52. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law of Japan], Law No. 121 of 1959, amended by Law No. 220 of
1999, art. 32, translated in http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs-new/pdf/en/jp/jp036en.pdf. Besides
all of the EPC member states and Japan, the patent laws of several other countries contain
such morality-based provisions, including China. See, e.g., Chinese Patent Law, supra note
22, at 295.
53. Council Directive 98/44, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13 (EC).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, Patenting Living Matter in the European
Community: Diriment of the Draft Directive, 16 FORDHAM INVL L.J. 990, 991 (1993)
(characterizing Europe's competitive disadvantage in the biotech industry as "approaching
perilous dimensions").
56. See Council Directive 98/44, supra note 53, 36-40, at 16; see also Donna M. Gitter,
Led Astray by the Moral Compass: Incorporating Morality into European Union Biotechnology
Patent Law, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2001) (describing controversy surrounding adoption
of the Directive).
57. Council Directive 98/44, supra note 53, art. 6, 1, at 18.
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contrary to ordre public or morality.58 Such unpatentable subject
matter includes processes for cloning human beings, processes for
modifying the germline identity of human beings, uses of human
embryos for industrial or commercial purposes, and processes for
modifying the genetic identity of animals likely to cause the animal
suffering without any substantial medical benefit.5 9
The European Patent Office, although not an arm of the EU,
voluntarily complied with the directive by amending the EPC
implementing regulations."0 In particular, Rule 23d61 entitled
"Exceptions to Patentability" further delineates EPC Article 53(a)'s
ordre public and morality provisions, providing:
Under Article 53(a), European patents shall not be granted in
respect of biotechnological inventions which, in particular,
concern the following:
(a) processes for cloning human beings;
(b) processes for modifying the germ line ge-
netic identity of human beings;
(c) uses of human embryos for industrial or
commercial purposes;
(d) processes for modifying the genetic iden-
tity of animals which are likely to cause
them suffering without any substantial
medical benefit to man or animal, and also
animals resulting from such processes."
In April 2006, questions regarding the rejection of the Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation's (WARF) patent application relating
to such stem cell products were referred to the EPO Enlarged Board
58. Id. 2, at 18-19.
59. Id.
60. See European Patent Office, Revision of the European Patent Convention (EPC 2000)
Synoptic Presentation EPC 1973/2000-Part II: The Implementing Regulations, O.J. E.P.O.
1 (Spec. Ed. May 1, 2007). All EU members are members of the European Patent
Organization.
61. Rule 23d is now rule 28(c) as a result of renumbering to implement EPC 2000. Id. at
42-43.
62. Id. at 43. The EPO has cited Rule 23d(c) in rejections of patent applications claiming
products created through the destruction of human embryos to obtain embryonic stem cells.
See, e.g., Press Release, European Patent Office, "Edinburgh" Patent Limited After European
Patent Office Opposition Hearing (July 24,2002), http://www.epo.orgtabout-us/press/releases
archive/2002/24072002.html.
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of Appeals to provide clarification on the parameters of the Rule 23d
exceptions.63
In the WARF case, the EPO Examining Division rejected certain
claims in WARF's European application under EPC Rule 23d(c) in
conjunction with EPC Article 53(a).' The rejected claims, which
were directed to, among other things, cell cultures comprising
primate embryonic stem cells and methods of maintaining such cell
cultures, were deemed to violate the prohibitions because they
required the use and destruction of human embryos as starting
material.65
The examiners considered it irrelevant that the claimed subject
matter related to cell cultures and not to a method of producing the
cell cultures because the only way to obtain the cell cultures was
through destruction of a human embryo.66 WARF appealed the
decision to the EPO Board of Appeals that, because of the impor-
tance of the issue, referred four questions to the Enlarged Board of
Appeals (EBOA) for decision. The EBOA heard oral arguments in
June of 2008 on the following questions:
1. Does r.23d(c) [now 28(c)] EPC apply to an application filed
before the entry into force of the rule?
2. If the answer to question 1 is yes, does r.23d(c) [now 28(c)]
EPC forbid the patenting of claims directed to products ...
which... at the filing date could be prepared exclusively by
a method which necessarily involved the destruction of the
human embryos from which the said products are derived,
if the said method is not part of the claims?
3. If the answer to question 1 or 2 is no, does art. 53(a) EPC
forbid patenting such claims?
4. In the context of questions 2 and 3, is it of relevance that
after the filing date the same products could be obtained
without ... the destruction of human embryos (here: e.g.
derivation from available human embryonic cell lines)?67
63. See Case T1374/04, WARF/Stem cells, [2006] E.P.O.R. 31, 2006 WL 1994709, at *349
(Technical Bd. of App. Apr. 7, 2006).
64. Id. at *333.
65. Id.
66. Id. at *334.
67. Case G2/06, WARF/stem cells, [2009] E.P.O.R. 15, 2008 WL 5725561, at *131
(Enlarged Bd. App. Nov. 25, 2008).
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In a November 2008 decision the EBOA answered "yes" to
questions 1 and 2 (negating the need to answer question 3) and "no"
to question 4, thus agreeing with the rejection of WARF's human
embryonic stem cell culture claims." The EBOA began by interpret-
ing the Rule 23d(c) prohibition in the context of EPC Article 53(a)
and Article 27(2) of TRIPS, which contain similar wording, and
noted that "[t]he forbidden exploitation must be something con-
travening the underlying legal principles of all contracting states."69
In considering the various arguments for and against allowing
patenting of the claim, the EBOA broadly construed both the
implementing rule and the concept of "invention," noting that "[a]
claimed new and inventive product must first be made before it can
be used. Such making is the ordinary way commercially to exploit
the claimed invention and falls within the monopoly granted."7 The
EBOA ultimately concluded, considering the intentions of the
legislators, that "it is not the fact of the patenting itself that is
considered to be against ordre public or morality, but it is the
performing of the invention, which includes a step (the use involving
its destruction of a human embryo) that has to be considered to
contravene those concepts." 1
Although WARF apparently did not seek a patent on the cell
cultures in Japan, the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) also has denied
patents on claims involving human embryonic stem cell-derived
inventions in some cases.72 Moreover, the Examination Guidelines
68. Id. at* 144.
69. Id. at *133. Interestingly, the Board noted that, as there was no constitutional tra-
dition common to member states nor international treaty stating that a pre-fourteen day
embryo should not be used for stem cell research, there was "no reason to forbid patenting of
a use involving extracting some cells from a pre-embryo." Id. This language suggests that the
violation of a common constitutional tradition or international treaty could be the basis for
denial of patentability under the EPC-illegal activity barring patentability.
70. Id. at *141.
71. Id. at *142.
72. Yoichi Yoshizawa, Comparative Analysis on Patentability of Human Embryonic Stem
Cells 49-54 (Sept. 11, 2006) (unpublished LL.M. IP thesis, Munich Intellectual Property Law
Center) (on file with author). However, a more recent commentary suggests this view may be
changing and that the JPO is open to patenting human embryonic stem cell inventions.
Koichi Sumikura, The Issues Surrounding Patent Protection for Human-Embryonic Stem Cells
and Therapeutic Cloning in Japan, 13 MPI STUD. ON INTELL. PROP., COMPETITION & TAX L.
111, 115-16 (2009). Also, the JPO has issued the world's first patent on induced pluripotent
stem cells, based on the reprogramming of adult stem cells. See Ben Jones, First Pluripotent
Stem Cell Patent Granted in Japan, BIONEWS, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.bionews.
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for Article 5 of the current Chinese Patent Act, which provides that
inventions incompatible with the law, social morality, or public
interest shall not be patented, list as unpatentable human embry-
onic stem cells and processes to prepare them, as well as the human
body at all stages of development. 3
Patent offices are not alone in invoking this morality-based in-
vention creation activity boundary. In December 2006, the German
Federal Patent Court (GFPC) partially revoked claims in a German
patent to Dr. Oliver Briistle on similar grounds to the EPO En-
larged Board of Appeals.7'4 The GFPC ruled that claims to stem cells
and methods for producing them that could involve the destruction
of human embryos violated the ordre public and morality provision
of the German Patent Act.75
These decisions likely do not express a broad view regarding the
relevance of invention creation activity to patentability outside of
their specific contexts.7'6 Nevertheless, they do show that immoral
conduct, as defined by appropriate legislative bodies, in invention
creation can be the basis for denial of patentability under certain
circumstances.
C. Where the Boundary Isn't: Unethical Invention Creation
Activity and Beyond
Morality and ethics are two words that are often used inter-
changeably. 'Morality" is derived from the Latin word moralis,
org.uk/page_13516.asp?hlight=Japan.
73. Tang Guangliang, Patentability of Research Results in Connection with Human-
Embryonic Stem Cells, Especially with the So-Called Therapeutic Cloning-Chinese Points of
View, 13 MPI STUD. ON INTELL. PROP., COMPETITION & TAX L. 68-69 (2009).
74. Martin Grund et al., Patentability of Human Embryonic Stem Cells-German Federal
Patent Court, 8 Bio-SCI. L. REV. 104, 104-05 (2007).
75. Id. at 104. Interestingly, the research that yielded the claimed inventions was legal
in Germany and was in fact funded in part by the German government. Id. at 105.
76. For example, in Howard Florey/Relaxin v. Fraktion der Griinen im Europdischen
Parlament, App. No. 83307553.4, [1995] E.P.O.R. 541, 1994 WL 1062472, at *542 (Opposition
Div. Dec. 8, 1994), several groups filed an opposition in the EPO to the issuance of a gene
patent for the hormone Relaxin. Id. at 544. The case included an (unsuccessful) argument
targeted at invention creation activity. The opponents argued that the patent would offend
Article 53(a) because, among other things, it involved taking tissue from a pregnant woman,
thus offending human dignity. Id. at 550.
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which relates to custom or manner. 7 "Ethics" is derived from the
Greek word ethos, which relates to moral character or custom.
7 8
Thus there is some similarity and overlap in the meaning of these
words, as they both deal with custom or behavior.79 One contextual
distinction that can be made between the two words, and which will
be used for the purposes of this Essay, relates to standards. We can
think of immoral behavior as violating particular societal stan-
dards of behavior and unethical conduct as violating particular
group standards of behavior. Though there do not appear to be any
instances of patents being invalidated or held unenforceable based
solely on unethical, as opposed to illegal and/or immoral, invention
creation activity as defined in this Essay, whether such invalidation
or refusal to enforce should occur is a question worth considering.
Formal and informal ethical norms and notions of commercial
morality can be found in various industry groups. In fact, in the
trade secret arena, which provides the primary alternative to patent
protection, the violation of such norms can form the basis for mis-
appropriation liability. 0 For example, in a case involving propri-
etary seed corn, the Eighth Circuit upheld a finding of trade secret
misappropriation when the defendant used improper means to
obtain samples of the plaintiffs corn and used the samples to
develop competing products."1 The court explained that "by labeling
certain wrongful, if not actually otherwise illegal, acts 'improper,'
trade secret law plays an important role in regulating commercial
behavior.... Our analysis is consistent with the stated purposes of
77. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1070, 1080 (2d ed. 1989).
78. Id. at 421.
79. One commentator characterizes the differences this way:
The moral sphere encompasses acts that are momentous rather than trivial,
that affect others as much as or more than the agent, that subject the agent to
blame or punishment if he chooses incorrectly, and that are a matter of
conscience. Narrowly defined, ethical questions are general and theoretical;
moral questions are specific, practical, and something else-this "something
else" varies from case to case.
CARL WELMAN, MORALS AND ETHIcS, at xvi-xvii (1975).
80. See, e.g., E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir.
1970). Such notions are also present to some degree in trademark and unfair competition law.
See, e.g., Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2 cmt. a (1995).
81. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1228 (8th Cir. 1994).
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trade secret protection: (1) maintaining commercial morality, and
(2) encouraging innovation."8 2
While encouraging innovation is a well-accepted goal of patent
law, maintaining commercial morality is not. Nevertheless, notions
regarding ethical conduct could be relevant in the context of patents.
Because of their specialized training, professionals, such as doctors,
lawyers, and engineers, have additional moral obligations, often
reflected in codes of conduct, beyond those of ordinary laymen. One
area in which the issue of unethical invention creation activity
could easily arise is in relation to informed consent. Medical
researchers are obligated under a number of professional creeds to
obtain the informed consent of their human research subjects. For
example, the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki on
Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects
(Helsinki Declaration) was designed to provide guidance to physi-
cians and "other participants in medical research involving human
subjects" including those conducting "research on identifiable
human material and data," and provides in part:
9. Medical research is subject to ethical standards that promote
respect for all human subjects and protect their health and
rights....
24. In medical research involving competent human subjects,
each potential subject must be adequately informed of the aims,
methods, sources of funding, any possible conflicts of interest,
institutional affliations of the researcher, the anticipated
benefits and potential risks of the study and the discomfort it
may entail .... The potential subject must be informed of the right
to refuse to participate in the study or to withdraw consent to
participate at any time without reprisal.... After ensuring that
the subject has understood the information, the physician ...
must then seek the potential subject's freely-given informed
consent, preferably in writing. If the consent cannot be ex-
pressed in writing, the non-written consent must be formally
documented and witnessed.83
82. Id. at 1238 n.42 (citation omitted).
83. WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR
MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 1-3 (2008), available at http://www.
wma.net/e/policy/pdf/17c.pdf. In the United States, the American Medical Association's Code
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The Helsinki Declaration is explicitly referenced in a European
Union directive covering the conduct of clinical trials on medicinal
products for human use, which grounds the conduct of such trials in
"the protection of human rights and the dignity of the human
being."'
A famous U.S. case involving unethical invention creation activ-
ity is Moore v. Regents of the University of California.85 In Moore, a
patient sued his former physician and his physician's employer for
using cells extracted from Moore's body to create and patent cell
lines that then provided considerable revenue to the physician and
the patent assignee, the University of California.8" Moore alleged
that the physician, Dr. Golde, had failed to disclose his economic
interest in Moore's tissues before obtaining consent to remove them.
Moore also charged the defendants with conversion of his personal
property, his body tissue.
While denying that Moore had a property interest in tissue
removed from his body, the Supreme Court of California did find
that a physician has a fiduciary duty to disclose any personal and
economic interest in research matters unrelated to the patient's
treatment that may affect the physician's judgment regarding such
treatment. The court concluded that Dr. Golde had such an interest
in Moore's cells at the time he was treating Moore and that Dr.
Golde had breached his fiduciary duty by failing to disclose his
interest to Moore. 7
If the patent laws allowed lack of informed consent in invention
creation to be a basis for patent invalidity or patent unen-
of Medical Ethics is the professional code accepted by virtually all state medical societies and
physician licensing bodies. See ETHICS AND QUALITY OF CARE: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION AND THE FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS 3 (1995),
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/1995_grpolEthicsand_Quality-oiCare.pdf.
84. Council Directive 2001/20, 2001 O.J. (L121) 34 (EC).
85. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
86. Id. at 479-83. Moore was also required to expend considerable time and money in
traveling across state lines to meet with the physician over a period of several years, during
which time the physician negotiated a $15 million contract with a pharmaceutical company
to develop Moore's cell line. See LORI ANDREWS & DOROTHY NELIN, BODY BAZAAR: THE
MARKET FOR HUMAN TISSUE IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY AGE 1 (2001).
87. Moore, 793 P.2d at 497. Two other recent cases involving similar issues of control over
donated human biological material and consent agreements are Washington University v.
Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007), and Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research
Institute, 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
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forceability, then Dr. Golde's patent in Moore could have been
affected because the Moore court held that the duty of informed
consent had been violated.'
Allowing violations of professional ethical codes during the
creation of an invention to affect patentability or patent enforce-
ability is, in some respects, perhaps even less justifiable than
considering illegal or immoral conduct. Professionals are under a
duty to be aware of the ethical standards of their calling. But to
conclude that these standards should be relevant when the profes-
sional is acting in the role of an inventor is a rather large step. Why
should the patents of professionals be subject to greater uncertainty
than patents obtained by other types of inventors? As one commen-
tator notes:
Ethics is the most daunting of subjects in professional practice
of any description; most likely because it often seems to be the
most amorphous and most arbitrary body of rules of all the
practicing professional concepts. Moreover, many ... of the rules
of professional ethics seem to have only the most attenuated
relationship to socio-religious behavior codes.
For example: ... (1) It may not be "immoral" for a lawyer to form
a law partnership with a non-lawyer; but, as of 2002, it was a
breach of Bar professional ethics in almost every jurisdiction.89
Casting too broad and undefined a net over unethical activity
could exacerbate the uncertainty already associated with patents to
untenable levels. 90 A more prudent approach might be to codify
specific ethical breaches on which there is widespread unanimity as
bases for patent unenforceability. For example, a physician's failure
to obtain informed consent or a researcher using data from publicly
condemned experiments, such as those performed by the Nazis,
could form bases for patent unforceability, unless rediscovered in an
88. Moore, 793 P.2d at 497. However, it seemingly would not have made much, if any,
financial difference for Moore himself unless the court imposed some type of constructive trust
on the patent in Moore's favor.
89. BETTE KESTER CONRAD, THE TAO OF LEGAL ETHICS 7, 13 (2003).
90. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 9 (2008) (arguing that poor notice in
patents can create a disincentive for innovation).
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ethical way.9 Yet even these seemingly straightforward pro-
scriptions could be fraught with difficulty in implementation due,
for example, to variations in what is required for adequate informed
consent under a particular set of circumstances. In the Washington
University v. Catalona case alone, the Eighth Circuit noted that
fifteen different versions of consent forms were used for six different
research studies.92 Furthermore, state laws on informed consent
govern the area implicating federalism concerns as discussed below.
II. THE INVENTION CREATION ACTIVITY BOUNDARY: CONTOURS AND
CONCERNS
At a sufficiently high level of abstraction, the above examples
point to a new invention creation boundary in patent law. However,
none of the examples illustrating the new boundary reflect an
explicit focus on the idea of creating liability for invention creation
activity per se. Rather, in each situation there is a more specific,
primary concern. In the WARF case, the concern relates to uses of
human embryos for industrial purposes. In the efforts to tie vio-
lations of laws regarding access to genetic resources to patentability,
the main concerns seem to be complying with the CBD and creating
a mechanism by which governments and indigenous groups can be
adequately compensated for their contributions to lucrative, other-
wise proprietary developments. Consequently, these scenarios may
not be evidence of a trend towards expansive penalties for invention
creation misconduct; rather, the creation of such penalties may be
an indirect and unintended effect of efforts to facilitate a different
91. Jeffrey H. Barker, Human Experimentation and the Double Facelessness of a Merciless
Epoch, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 603, 604 (1999). There is a fair amount of
disagreement regarding whether the Nazi data should be used. As one researcher who has
chosen to use Nazi-generated hypothermia data states, "I don't want to have to use this data,
but there is no other and will be no other in an ethical world." Kristine Moe, Should the Nazi
Research Data Be Cited?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1984, at 5, 5 (quoting researcher John
S. Hayward of the University of Victoria in British Columbia).
92. 1490 F.3d 667, 671 n.3 (8th Cir. 2007).
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policy.9 3 Nevertheless, it is worth considering some of the possible
impacts and opportunities the new boundary could create.
At least two different groups could benefit from a new invention
creation activity boundary: First, alleged infringers, who might be
able to challenge the enforceability of a relevant patent. Second, an
inventor's victims, pursuing a form of justice for injuries sustained
as a result of the invention creation process such as, for example,
indigenous groups seeking imposition of a constructive trust or
other compensation for traditional knowledge misappropriation.
But there are also potential losers, even beyond the inventors, if
invention creation activity is considered in patentability or patent
enforceability analyses. For example, an innocent patent assignee
might be unaware of any irregularities in invention creation conduct
despite the exercise of due diligence. A failure to ensure protections
for such parties could raise the uncertainty surrounding patent
rights significantly. On the other hand, such uncertainty already
exists for assignees under the doctrine of inequitable conduct. If a
society chooses to penalize invention creation misconduct in order
to discourage such activity and avoid the possibility of "patent
laundering," the innocent assignee might just have to suffer.
93. For example, the very same EU Biotech Directive that provided the basis for creation
of an immoral invention creation activity boundary in the EPO explicitly declines to impose
penalties for failing to disclose the origin of genetic resources:
If an invention is based on biological material of plant or animal origin ... the
patent application should ... include information on the geographical origin of
such material[;] ... this is without prejudice to the processing of patent
applications or the validity of rights arising from granted patents.
Council Directive 98/44, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 15 (EC) (emphasis added). Moreover, some
countries, such as Norway, require DOO but penalize noncompliance outside of the patent
system. Section 8(b) of the Norway Patent Act provides in part:
If an invention concerns or uses biological material, the patent application shall
include information on the country from which the inventor collected or received
the material (the providing country). If it follows from the national law in the
providing country that access to biological material shall be subject to prior
consent, the application shall state whether such consent has been obtained....
Breach of the duty to disclose information is subject to penalty in accordance
with the General Civil Penal Code § 166. The duty to disclose information is
without prejudice to the processing of patent applications or the validity of
rights arising from granted patents.
Lov om Patenter [Patents Act] (2008) (Nor.), translated in http://www.patentstyret.no/
upload/Filarkiv/regelverkfNorwegianPatentsAct.pdf.
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The presence of equitable doctrines relating to pre-patent issu-
ance and post-patent issuance inventor/owner activity in patent law
supports the concept of considering pre-patent filing activity in the
equities of patent enforcement. The mere fact that remedies for
inappropriate invention creation activity already exist outside of the
patent system does not mean that such activity should be irrelevant
to patentability or patent enforceability. Such opportunities for dual
relief are already present in the patent system and outside of it. For
example, declarations submitted to the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) under 37 C.F.R. § 1.68 are submitted under penalty
of perjury. Thus, if false statements are made in such documents,
they would provide a basis for the patent to be unenforceable due to
inequitable conduct even though a separate criminal penalty for
perjury would also be applicable.94
Analogies also can be found in other areas of U.S. law where
"bad" activity impacts property rights. For example, property for-
feiture statutes allow the government to seize houses and other
property that have been used in the conduct of illegal activity such
as drug trafficking,95 and "murderous heirs" have been denied
estates to which they would otherwise have been entitled.96 Also,
under "Son of Sam" statutes, criminals have been deprived of the
economic fruits of their crimes. And in copyright law, creators of
derivative works who use the work of another without authorization
are not entitled to a copyright in any part of the work in which
material is used unlawfully.9" Though none of these analogies
perfectly matches the context under discussion, they do suggest that
94. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.68 (2009), which provides:
Any document to be filed in the Patent and Trademark Office and which is
required by any law, rule, or other regulation to be under oath may be
subscribed to by a written declaration. Such declaration may be used in lieu of
the oath otherwise required, if, and only if, the declarant is on the same
document, warned that willful false statements and the like are punishable by
fine or imprisonment, or both (18 U.S.C. 1001) and may jeopardize the validity
of the application or any patent issuing thereon.
95. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 46-47 (1993)
(requiring that the Government afford the owner due process before such seizure).
96. See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
97. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). Moreover, physicians have lost their licenses to practice
medicine after committing an offense involving "moral turpitude" such as filing a fraudulent
tax return. See In re Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824, 825-27 (Wash. 1958).
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considering illegal invention creation activity in patent enforce-
ability analyses is not completely anomalous. s8
Moreover, as explained by the Supreme Court in Precision
Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance
Machinery Co. 9: "[O]ne's misconduct need not necessarily have been
of such a nature as to be punishable as a crime .... [A]ny willful act
concerning the cause of action which rightfully can be said to
transgress equitable standards of conduct is sufficient cause for the
invocation of the maxim by the chancellor."' '0 The Court further
noted the important public interest at stake:
[Patents] ... are matters concerning far more than the interests
of the adverse parties. The possession and assertion of patent
rights are "issues of great moment to the public." A patent by its
very nature is affected with a public interest. As recognized by
the Constitution, it is a special privilege designed to serve the
public purpose of promoting the "Progress of Science and useful
Arts." At the same time, a patent is an exception to the general
rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and
open market. The far-reaching social and economic consequences
of a patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest in
seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free
from fraud or other inequitable conduct and that such monopo-
lies are kept within their legitimate scope.' 0'
While the Supreme Court is undoubtedly correct on this point,
there are other issues at stake. Patents provide important incen-
tives for inventors to engage in activity that results in socially
beneficial knowledge and products. However, the costs of obtaining
patent protection are significant and increasing, and the uncer-
tainty surrounding the real value of issued patents can be a
deterrent to obtaining patent protection. Any proposal creating
98. Suppression of evidence gathered in violation of the Constitution presents similar
issues. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) ("[Ihe more apt question in
such a case is 'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to
which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead
by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." (quoting JOHN
MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959))).
99. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
100. Id. at 815.
101. Id. at 815-16 (emphasis added).
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liability for invention creation activity potentially could be seen as
a further disincentive to engage in the patent process because of the
added uncertainty it would create in relation to patent enforcement.
Also, with compensation for many types of illegal or unethical
invention creation activity available outside of the patent system,
10 2
injecting such a new inquiry into the already complex patent arena
may in some cases be redundant and in others simply unwise.'
In the United States, federalism concerns also would be relevant
to this issue. The right to exclude granted to a patentee is a right
granted under the federal patent laws.' °4 If, for example, the illegal
invention creation activity is theft, it normally would be defined by
state law and those standards and definitions can vary from state
to state.'10 Although the prohibition of a federal statute cannot be
"set at naught" by a state statute,10' it is possible for state statutes
to impact federal rights. In fact, some federal statutes by definition
require recourse to state law to ascertain their parameters.
0 7
Patent law is, at base, utilitarian and was designed to effectuate
the constitutional object of "promoting the progress of ... the useful
arts" by granting an exclusive right, for a limited time, to inventors
for their discoveries.10' The lure of patent exclusivity can be a strong
incentive for the creation of new products and processes and their
disclosure for the advancement of knowledge and the benefit of
society at large. But that incentive can be diminished significantly
if the rights granted by a patent are not seen as commensurate with
the expense and inconvenience involved in obtaining the right, and
102. For example, compensation may be available in civil damages suits for tortious
conduct.
103. See F. Scott Kieff, Patents for Environmentalists, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 307, 317-18
(2002) (suggesting that biodiversity custodians who do not receive a share of patent profits
despite their contributions to patented inventions be compensated through ordinary market
and political mechanisms outside of the patent system).
104. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2001)
(analyzing whether a California state conviction for petty theft constitutes an aggravated
felony under federal law, and noting that "[tihe language of the California theft statute is
unique among the states').
106. See Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young, 138 F.2d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 1943).
107. See generally Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local
Criminal Laws and the Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARYL. REV.
143 (2009).
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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if enforcement of the right is hindered by a lack of legal clarity and
certainty.
In a recent book, James Bessen and Michael Meurer argue that,
in many technology areas, patents now provide a disincentive to
innovation because of their poor boundaries, which provide insuffi-
cient notice to third parties of what the patents cover. °9 As a result,
the authors assert that patents are not really working as property-
based incentives. For example, they note that:
By the late 1990s the risk of patent litigation for public firms
outside of the chemical and pharmaceutical industries exceeded
the profits derived from patents. This means that patents likely
provided a net disincentive for innovation for the firms who fund
the lion's share of industrial R&D; that is, patents tax R&D.110
Thus, they contend, the risk of patent litigation has increased
because the metes and bounds of the property right are unclear and
their enforceability value uncertain. There are, unfortunately, many
culprits in the patent system responsible for that uncertainty and
lack of clarity. A few examples include claim construction (deter-
mining what the claims mean), nonobviousness, application of the
doctrine of equivalents, and the standard for determining if a
patentee engaged in inequitable conduct in procuring a patent.
Moreover, after a patent issues, broader claims may be added to it
for a period of up to two years, or a continuation application could
remain on file in the USPTO to which further claims could be added
for an even longer period. These are just a few of the many areas of
uncertainty currently associated with patents. Creating liability
within the patent system for inappropriate invention creation
activity would exacerbate this existing uncertainty and could be
expected, at least in the short term, to further erode patent value.
A truly daunting question is how a court, legislature, or patent
office is to determine which activities are sufficiently egregious to
warrant denial of a patent or patent unenforceability. Of course, the
major challenge with employing morality or ethical standards in the
patent realm is the fluidity and context specificity of moral and
ethical behavior. Societal standards vary over time and place with
109. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 90, at 62.
110. Id. at 144.
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different societies having different conceptions of right or wrong
behavior. Likewise, different groups have differing ethical standards
of behavior that also may change over time. Without sufficient con-
straints, inquiring into the morality or ethics of invention creation
activity could encompass vast vistas of behavior and cast an
untenable level of uncertainty over the patent right. These issues do
not mean that liability for egregious invention creation activity
should not be imposed. However, they do suggest that such inquiries
might work best, and with the least negative impact on incentives,
where such consensus has been achieved that positive law codifica-
tion of the standard takes place, such as is seen in the European
Union Biotechnology Directive definitions of immoral inventions
and the patent laws of countries such as China, India, and Brazil.
CONCLUSION
The human embryonic stem cell cases and the genetic resources
acquisition provisions are examples of a new invention creation
activity boundary in patent law. On one level, the creation of such
a boundary is intuitively appealing; no one wants a Grenouille to
profit from his crime in any way. However, the patent system's
historical lack of concern with the legality or the morality of
invention creation conduct is consistent with its utilitarian focus. A
reevaluation of the wisdom and fairness of this approach seems
timely, especially in view of the expansion in patent-eligible subject
matter and continuing concerns invoked by the patenting of genetic
material.
Nevertheless, perhaps the slow evolution of categories of patent-
impacting invention creation activity misconduct is appropriate
considering the potential impact on the patent incentive and the
lack of consensus on standards of ethical and moral behavior and on
the extent to which illegal behavior should influence the patent
realm. The creation of this new boundary in patent law holds the
promise of both benefits and hazards. If development of this new
boundary occurs at all, prudence counsels in favor of it being
cautious, incremental, and well-considered.
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